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ABSTRACT: The authors address the repeated efforts to remove the 
commander, a commissioned officer in command or an officer in 
charge, from the military justice system and adopt a system that 
mirrors the procedures used in foreign countries for preferring 
charges, referring them to trial, and selecting court members. They 
offer a number of arguments for retaining the commander’s role and 
offer a comparative analysis of the American military justice system 
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Congress not to adopt the procedures used in foreign countries 
absent clear evidence that doing so will greatly enhance American 
military justice. They conclude there are insufficient reasons to make 
dramatic changes to the American system; changes they believe 
would undermine the commander’s authority to enforce discipline 
and justice. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If there is one aspect of the American military justice system that 
seems to draw the most criticism, it is the role of the commander. 
Although the commander has played an essential role in military 
justice since the beginning of the republic, 1  reformers over the 
decades have banged the drum for change, which would either 
reduce or remove the commander’s prosecutorial discretion.2  
The proposals to limit or remove the commander’s powers to 
prefer court-martial charges or convene a court-martial generally fall 
into three categories. The first category of proposals recommends 





1  See generally DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, § 1-4, et. seq. (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the historical roots of the court-
martial and the commander’s role). 
2 See, e.g., Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Breaking The Chain Of Command Culture: A Call 
For An Independent And Impartial Investigative Body To Curb Sexual Assaults In The 
Military, 29 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC'Y 341, 371-75 (2014) (recommending that DOD 
strip military commanders of authority to dispose of sexual assault complaints; 
authority to handle cases should rest with independent and impartial body after 
military police conduct a comprehensive investigation); Don Christensen, Commanders 
Flunk on Military Justice Reforms, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2014, 8:34 AM), 
archived at https://perma.cc/Q8AS-MTH8 (criticizing the current military justice 
system and proposing reform); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military 
Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 n.10 (1973) (noting that proposed legislative reforms 
had been introduced by Senators Bayh and Ervin and by Congressman Bennett that 
included limiting a commander's role and limiting court-martial jurisdiction); 
Schiesser & Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-Martial Courts: The Removal of 
Commanders from Military Justice, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 559 (1976). 





by a commander outside the accused’s chain of command, but still 
within the military command structure.3 These proposals, which are 
not entirely new,4 are grounded in the view that a commander may 
be biased in favor of an accused and decide, for improper reasons, 
not to charge said accused.5 Ironically, in the past, reformers pushed 
for changes in the military justice system because they believed the 
system was unfair; they argued that heavy-handed commanders 





3 See, e.g., Laura Basset, Senators Shoot Down Gillibrand's Military Sexual Assault Reform 
Bill, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 2:10 PM), archived at 
https://perma.cc/J8EH-GHUD. As discussed, infra, Senator Gillibrand introduced 
essentially the same bill in 2020 (discussing Senator Gillibrand’s sponsorship of the 
Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) which proposed that commanders would no 
longer have jurisdiction over specified offenses and the commander’s power to grant 
post-trial clemency would be limited. S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). Her proposal 
ultimately failed in the Senate). 
4 See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, What is to be done? Herewith a Proposed Ansell-Hodson Military 
Justice Reform Act of 2014 (May 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/4WMA-9HSX 
(proposing “Ansell-Hodson Military Justice Reform Act of 2014” which would have 
reduced commander’s authority and transferred authority of convening authority to 
court-martial administrator).  
5 See Lindsay Hoyle, Command Responsibility—A Legal Obligation to Deter Sexual Violence 
in the Military, 37 B.C. INT’L & & COMP. L. REV. 353, 360 (2014) (noting that commanders 
are often biased in favor of an accused with whom they have a good working 
relationship). But the opposite is also true. Critics of the system argue commanders 
may be biased against a service member and treat that service member unfairly; it was 
that criticism which in part led to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
following World War II. See David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 
87 MIL. L. REV. 131, 158 (1980) (noting the perceived injustice toward service members 
in World War II); Frederick Bernays Weiner, The Seamy Side of the World War I Court-
Martial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109, 112 (1989) (noting prosecution of enlisted 
service members, in part, prompted the “Crowder-Ansell” dispute during World War 
I concerning court-martial practices and its underlying currents). Yet another related 
criticism is commanders may treat similarly situated service members differently. 
James W. Smith, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of 
the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 693 (2006) (using the term 
“different spanks for different ranks” and arguing the military justice system failed by 
treating officers and enlisted members differently in Abu-Ghraib courts-martial). 
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 





push for removing the commander seems to rest on the proposition 
that not enough alleged offenders are being prosecuted for sexual 
assault. 
A second category of proposals recommends that civilian 
prosecutors handle prosecution of military offenses, which is the 
approach in certain other countries. 7  The proponents of that 
approach argue that the change would be consistent with emerging 
international norms. The argument is if that approach works well in 
other countries, it would likely work well in the American military 
justice system.8  
Finally, there have been proposals to transfer, in whole or in part, 





7 See generally Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice, 
48 A.F. L. REV. 195, 197 (2000) (noting that changes in country after country are being 
made as to how military cases are prosecuted, and by whom and that American 
military justice “pays precious little attention to developments in other countries’ 
systems;” the author is a frequent advocate for reducing the role of the commander in 
the military justice system); Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military 
Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1400 (1973) (noting that in considering potential changes to 
the military justice system, other countries’ approaches are “especially relevant”). 
8 See Editorial, No Hope for Justice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 4:00 AM), archived 
at https://perma.cc/844K-CY46 (discussing reasoning of supporters such as New 
York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault crimes in the U.S. military 
justice system from the chain of command, in the same manner as Canada, Israel and 
Germany have done); Remove Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of 
Command, Nat’l Org. for Women, archived at https://perma.cc/8LMS-8ALW 
(discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of command in 
the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain, Canada, and 
Israel); Op-Ed., Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The 
Military, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 13, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/S398-
3GXV (emphasizing that removal of sexual assaults from the chain of command has 
already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should occur in the United States 
military justice system). 
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Murphy, The Military Justice Divide: Why Only Crimes and Lawyers 
Belong in The Court-Martial Process, 220 MIL. L. REV. 129, 175 (2014) (proposing that 
military lawyers obtain prosecutorial discretion over disposition of offenses); Letter 
 





the arguments supporting that approach is that armed forces lawyers 
are in the best position to assess whether a particular charged offense 
warrants a court-martial10 and that, again, is the approach taken in 
certain other countries.11  
It is this third and final category of proposals that is the focus of 
this article. There are currently two proposed legislative provisions 
along these lines that would adversely affect the commander’s 
prosecutorial discretion and undermine the commander’s ability to 
enforce good order and discipline. The first proposed provision was 
included in Section 540F of the 2020 National Defense Authorization 
Act, where Congress mandated that the Department of Defense 
report to the congressional armed services committees. This would 
be based on the feasibility of creating a pilot program, which would 





from Heidi Boghosian, Exec. Dir., National Lawyers Guild to Mr. Paul S. Koffsky, 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense (June 30, 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/B3C8-NEPR (recommending that prosecutorial discretion be 
placed in the hands of independent prosecutors). 
10 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 9, at 175–76 (2014) (listing reasons for military attorneys 
to exert prosecutorial discretion instead of commanders).  
11 See Sherman, supra note 2, at 1425 (arguing the American military justice system 
should follow the model used in the British or West German-Swedish military 
systems); see also No Hope for Justice, supra note 8 (discussing the reasoning of 
supporters such as New York Senator Kirsten Gillibrand for removing sexual assault 
crimes in the U.S. military justice system “from the chain of command to independent 
prosecutors,” in the same manner as used in Canada, Israel and Germany); Remove 
Prosecution of Sexual Assault from Military Chain of Command, Nat’l Org. for Women, 
supra note 8 (discussing the need to remove sexual assault crimes from the chain of 
command in the U.S. military justice system and adopt a separate system like Britain, 
Canada, and Israel); Gillibrand Should Keep Up the Pressure to End Sexual Assaults in The 
Military, supra note 8 (emphasizing that the removal of sexual assaults from the chain 
of command has already occurred in Britain, Canada, and Israel, and should also occur 
in the United States military justice system). 





martial charges for serious offenses, and instead place that authority 





12 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 540F, 
133 Stat. 1198 (2019). This section provides: 
 
SEC. 540F. REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVING 
ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO 
PREFER OR REFER CHANGES FOR FELONY OFFENSES UNDER THE 
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.  
 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—  
 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on 
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report 
setting forth the results of a study, conducted for purposes of the report, on 
the feasibility and advisability of an alternative military justice system in 
which determinations as to whether to prefer or refer charges for trial by 
court-martial for any offense specified in paragraph (2) is made by a judge 
advocate in grade O–6 or higher who has significant experience in criminal 
litigation and is outside of the chain of command of the member subject to 
the charges rather than by a commanding officer of the member who is in 
the chain of command of the member.  
(2) SPECIFIED OFFENSE.—An offense specified in this paragraph is any 
offense under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice), for which the maximum punishment authorized 
includes confinement for more than one year.  
 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required for purposes of the report under 
subsection (a) shall address the following:  
 
(1) Relevant procedural, legal, and policy implications and considerations 
of the alternative military justice system described in subsection (a).  
(2) An analysis of the following in connection with the implementation and 
maintenance of the alternative military justice system: (A) Legal personnel 
requirements. (B) Changes in force structure. (C) Amendments to law. (D) 
Impacts on the timeliness and efficiency of legal processes and court-martial 
adjudications. (E) Potential legal challenges to the system. (F) Potential 
changes in prosecution and conviction rates. (G) Potential impacts on the 
preservation of good order and discipline, including the ability of a 
 





The second proposal appears in the “Military Justice 
Improvement Act of 2020” (S.1932), introduced by Senator Kirstin 
Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), and would dramatically reduce the 
commander’s authority and responsibility for preferring and 
referring felony-level offenses to trial by court-martial, and transfer 
that authority to senior judge advocates.13  
This article argues that those proposals, and others like them, 
should be rejected for the following reasons: 
• Commanders play a critical and necessary role in the 
American military justice system (See Sections II & IV, 
infra); 
• Transferring prosecutorial discretion from commanders 
to judge advocates will undermine commanders’ 
authority to maintain good order and discipline (See 





commander to carry out nonjudicial punishment and other administrative 
actions. (H) Such other considerations as the Secretary considers 
appropriate.  
(3) A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of relevant foreign 
allies with the current military justice system of the United States and the 
alternative military justice system, including whether or not approaches of 
the military justice systems of such allies to determinations described in 
subsection (a) are appropriate for the military justice system of the United 
States.  
(4) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of conducting a pilot 
program to assess the feasibility and advisability of the alternative military 
justice system, and, if the pilot program is determined to be feasible and 
advisable— (A) an analysis of potential legal issues in connection with the 
pilot program, including potential issues for appeals; and (B) 
recommendations on the following: (i) The populations to be subject to the 
pilot program. (ii) The duration of the pilot program. (iii) Metrics to measure 
the effectiveness of the pilot program. (iv) The resources to be used to 
conduct the pilot program.  
13 The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020). 





• Transferring the decision to prosecute and refer charges 
to a court-martial will create unintended consequences 
(See Section VI, infra); 
• Changing the American military justice system to 
emulate the systems of other countries is not warranted 
or advisable. Comparison of sexual assault prosecution 
rates of the United States military with four United 
States allies in 2013 and with three allies more recently 
does not necessitate adopting their systems of removal 
of command responsibility for prosecuting serious sex 
crimes (See Section VII, infra);  
• The proposed amendments will adversely affect the 
delicate balance between justice and discipline (See 
Section VIII, infra);  
• Recent studies of command decisions to prosecute 
sexual assaults demonstrates that the current system is 
working (See Section IX, infra); and 
• Congress should await implementation of the reforms 
outlined in the Military Justice Act of 2016 for oversight 
and accountability (See Section X, infra). 
Finally, this article recommends Congress should reaffirm the 
role of the commander to enforce good order and discipline (See 
Section XI, infra). 
II. THE COMMANDER’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Before addressing the specific concerns about the proposals to 
reduce or remove the commander from the military justice system, it 
is important to first address the typical military chain of command 
and how the individuals in that chain can be involved in the 
processing of court-martial charges. 





A. THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The chain of command of an accused in an Army infantry 
division, for example, begins with the immediate commander or unit 
commander usually at the level of a company commander (captain 
or O-3 rank in command of 200 personnel), followed by a battalion 
commander (lieutenant colonel or O-5 in command of 1,000 
personnel), brigade commander (colonel or O-6 rank in command of 
5,000 personnel) and then by a division commander, who is a general 
court-martial convening authority (major general or O-8 rank in 
command of 15,000 personnel).  
Various command levels above the division level are also general 
courts-martial convening authorities, including the corps 
commander (lieutenant general O-9 rank in command of 45,000 
personnel), major command commander (general O-10 in command 
of 90,000 personnel), then Secretary of the Army (civilian), Secretary 
of Defense (civilian), and President.14 Each higher level commander 
in the chain of command has authority to overrule a decision of a 
lower level of commander in the referral to trial of a court-martial 
offense.15 
B. PREFERRING AND REFERRING COURT-MARTIAL 
CHARGES 
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 
Manual for Courts-Martial, commanders (usually the company 





14 See Department of Defense, Military Units: Army–Department of Defense, archived 
at https://perma.cc/J6JL-CF2P. See also 10 U.S.C. § 822 (listing general court-martial 
convening authorities). 
15 See Manual for Courts-Martial (2019) [hereinafter MCM]; Rule for Courts-Martial 
306 [hereinafter RCM].  





conducting a thorough and impartial inquiry into alleged offenses.16 
In carrying out those duties, they review reports prepared by law 
enforcement personnel and regularly obtain legal advice from a 
judge advocate, who is assigned to the military organization, or 
otherwise charged with providing legal advice to the commanders.17  
The UCMJ 18  includes punitive articles which proscribe both 
strictly military offenses,19 such as desertion20 and disobedience of an 
order 21  as well as common law offenses, such as larceny. 22  If it 
appears that a service member has violated a punitive article, the 
commander has broad discretion to decide how to dispose of an 
accused's misconduct. For example, the commander may simply 
counsel the service member or issue a written or oral reprimand,23 
begin proceedings to administratively discharge the service 
member, 24  or impose nonjudicial punishment. 25  Under this third 





16 RCM 303. 
17 See UCMJ art. 37 (2018) (including requirement that before convening a general 
court-martial the convening authority must consider the advice of the staff judge 
advocate). This is sometimes referred to as the “pretrial advice.” SCHLUETER, supra 
note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018) 
18 UCMJ arts. 1-146 (2018). 
19  See generally DAVID A. SCHLUETER, CHARLES H. ROSE, VICTOR HANSEN, & 
CHRISTOPHER BEHAN, MILITARY CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing 
punitive articles in UCMJ). 
20 UCMJ art. 85 (2018). 
21 UCMJ art. 90 (2018). 
22 UCMJ art. 121 (2018).  
23 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1-8 (10th ed. 2018) (listing various options available 
to the military commander). 
24 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1-8(B) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing nonpunitive 
measures such as administrative discharge).  
25 UCMJ art. 15 (2018). Unless the service member is assigned to a vessel, the service 
member may demand a court-martial in lieu of the nonjudicial punishment. Id. The 
term “vessel” is defined in 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). “The word “vessel” includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, 
as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2018).  





and, if so, adjudges the punishment.26 Finally, the commander may 
formally prefer court-martial charges against the service member.27 
Article 33, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, requires the 
President to provide non-binding guidance for factors that 
commanders are to consider in disposing of charges.28 The President 
has set out those factors in Appendix 2.1.2 of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, which lists the following factors: 
a. The mission-related responsibilities of the command; 
b. Whether the offense occurred during wartime, combat, or 
contingency operations; 
c. The effect of the offense on the morale, health, safety, 
welfare, and good order and discipline of the command; 
d. The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the offense 
and the accused’s culpability in connection with the offense; 
e. In cases involving an individual who is a victim under 
Article 6b, the views of the victim as to disposition; 
f. The extent of the harm caused to any victim of the offense; 
g. The availability and willingness of the victim and other 
witnesses to testify; 
h. Admissible evidence will likely be sufficient to obtain and 





26 See RCM 306(c)(2).  
27 Although technically, any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges against 
another; the preferral is almost always done by the service member’s immediate 
commander.  
28 UCMJ art. 33 (2018). 





i. Input, if any, from law enforcement agencies involved in 
or having an interest in the specific case; 
j. The truth-seeking function of trial by court-martial; 
k. The accused’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation 
or prosecution of others; 
l. The accused’s criminal history or history of misconduct, 
whether military or civilian, if any; 
m. The probable sentence or other consequences to the 
accused of a conviction; and 
n. The impact and appropriateness of alternative disposition 
options—including nonjudicial punishment or 
administrative action—with respect to the accused’s 
potential for continued service and the responsibilities of the 
command with respect to justice and good order and 
discipline.29 
 If, after considering those factors, a commander prefers 
court-martial charges, those charges are forwarded up the chain of 
command, described supra, for recommendations and actions. If the 
commander concludes that the charges are serious enough to justify 
a general court-martial, which are equivalent to a civilian felony trial, 
the commander orders an Article 32 hearing.30 At that hearing, which 
approximates a preliminary hearing in civilian criminal justice trials, 
the service member is entitled to be present, to have the assistance of 






29 Non-Binding Disposition Guidance § 2.1, MCM, App. 2.1-2. 
30 UCMJ art. 32. (2018). 
31 UCMJ art. 32. (2018). 





If a convening authority, a commander authorized by the UCMJ 
to “convene” a court-martial, decides to refer the charges to a court-
martial, that officer selects the court members. 32  The convening 
authority does not select the counsel or the military judge. 33  A 
commander convenes a court-martial to hear a specific case.34 
Specific provisions in the UCMJ prohibit a convening authority 
from unlawfully influencing the participants in the court-martial or 
the outcome of the case. 35  In many cases, the accused and the 
convening authority engage in plea bargaining and execute a pretrial 
agreement. 36  Typically, those agreements require the accused to 





32 UCMJ arts. 23–24 (2018) (authority to convene general courts-martial, special courts-
martial, and summary courts-martial). 
33  SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 8-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing the process for 
selecting individuals to sit as court members).  
34 See UCMJ arts. 22–24 (2018) (designating those with power to convene general, 
special, and summary courts-martial); RCM 504 (setting out procedure for convening 
courts-martial). The UCMJ provides that the President of the United States and a 
service Secretary may convene a general court-martial. UCMJ art. 24(a), (2012). 
35  See UCMJ art. 37 (2018). Unlawful command influence has been the subject of 
considerable commentary and case law. See generally Martha Huntley Bower, Unlawful 
Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing 
unlawful command influence); Anthony P. DeGiulio, Command Control: Lawful Versus 
Unlawful Application, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 72 (1972) (examining the disciplinary 
policies established by command directives, the rule which blocks the accused from 
serving as the convening authority, and command control over counsel and military 
judges); James D. Harty, Unlawful Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36 
NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986) (discussing corrective measures that must be taken when 
commanders commit unlawful command influence); Joseph Hely, Command Influence 
on Military Justice, 15 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 300 (1970) (discussing inherent tendency for 
command influence). 
36 SCHLUETER, supra note 1, ch. 9 (10th ed. 2018).  
37 Id.  





Even though courts-martial are not part of the federal judiciary, 
the Supreme Court of the United States may ultimately review a 
military conviction.38  
III. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF PROPOSALS TO LIMIT THE 
COMMANDER’S ROLE IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM  
As noted, supra, there are currently two pieces of legislation 
pending in Congress that would shift prosecutorial discretion from 
commanders to senior judge advocates, both attempting to emulate 
the systems used in other countries. Notably, not all cases would be 
affected by the shift in responsibilities from commanders to senior 
judge advocates. Only disposition of serious offenses would be 
affected. Offenses that are considered to be military in nature, and 
not common law offenses, would remain untouched. 
While neither of the proposed legislative provisions outline any 
of the alleged problems that they are designed to address, attempts 
to remove commanders from the military justice system are not new. 





38 UCMJ art. 67(h) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2018). See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2165, 2173 (2018) (holding that Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces). See generally Andrew Effron, 
Supreme Court of Review of Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals: The Legislative 
Background, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1985, at 59 (reviewing the Military Justice Act, which 
placed the Court of Military Appeals directly under the U.S. Supreme Court’s review). 
39 In 2013, Senator Gillibrand sponsored the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA) 
which proposed that commanders would no longer have jurisdiction over specified 
offenses and the commander’s power to grant post-trial clemency would be limited. 
S. 967, 113th Cong. (2013). As with the currently proposed legislation, her bill would 
have required that for offenses where the maximum punishment included 
confinement for more than one year (in effect a felony grade offense), the decision to 
file court-martial charges and refer charges to general or special courts-martial would 
be made by someone in the rank of at least O-6, with significant experience in trying 
courts-martial, and outside the chain of command. Id. That responsibility would be 
handled by officers established by the Chiefs of Staff of each Service. Id. Although 
 





time, a series of advisory panels comprised of civilian, non-
governmental experts have reviewed the role of the commander and 
rejected such a wide-sweeping change, because such change was not 
justified. Specifically, the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault 
Crimes Panel (RSP) (congressionally mandated to assess the impact 
of removing disposition authority from commanders) in June 2014 
reported that: 
Congress should not further limit the authority of convening 
authorities under the UCMJ to refer charges of sexual assault 
crimes to trial by court-martial . . . [and] [a]fter reviewing the 
practices of Allied militaries and available civilian statistics 
and hearing from many witnesses, the Panel determined the 
evidence [did] not support a conclusion that removing 
convening authority from senior commanders [would] 
reduce the incidence of sexual assault . . . or improve the 
quality of investigations or prosecutions . . . .”40  
And even before the extensive changes enacted in the Military 
Justice Acts of 2016 and 2018, the Panel warned that systematic 
changes “should be considered carefully in the context of the many 
changes” made to the “form and function of the military system.”41 
In 2015, the Military Justice Review Group focused on measures to 
improve the process rather than revisiting the issue after the RSP’s 
thorough review, and specifically recommended “[re]taining the 
current procedures for the exercise of disposition discretion based 





Senator Gillibrand’s bill had bipartisan support, it eventually failed in the Senate by a 
close vote. See Basset, supra note 3. 
40 Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel Report 6 (2014), archived 
at https://perma.cc/8Q7U-CUJG. 
41 Id. 





[J]udge [A]dvocates, and judge advocates.”42 In 2019, the Defense 
Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of 
Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) (tasked with 
reviewing specific case dispositions), based on a review of 164 
military investigative cases, found that “commanders’ disposition of 
penetrative sexual assault complaints [were] reasonable in 95% of the 
cases.”43 See Section IX, infra.  
Furthermore, since 2013, extensive substantive changes to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (e.g., the Military Justice 
Acts of 2016 and 2018) and Manual for Courts-Martial have been put 
in place, and those changes require time for implementation and 
reassessment of the military justice system before additional reforms 
should be made. Provisions are in place requiring that convening 
authorities’ decisions not to refer sexual assault cases must be 
reviewed (See Section X, infra.), while also substantially limiting their 
clemency authority. An appendix to the Manual for Courts-Martial 
now provides commanders with factors they should consider in all 
misconduct cases (e.g., “interests of justice,” “the views of the victim 
as to disposition,” “the harm caused to any victim of the offense,” 
and “good order and discipline”), inappropriate factors (e.g., “the 
accused’s race or religion” and “political pressure”), and special 
considerations (e.g., “whether the accused might face prosecution in 
another jurisdiction”).44 Pursuant to the Military Justice Act of 2016, 
convening authorities must have “periodic training regarding the 





42 Military Justice Review Group, Report of the Military Justice Review Group Part I: 
UCMJ Recommendations 300 (2015), archived at https://perma.cc/58Y7-528X. 
43 Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual 
Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) Third Annual Report 31 (2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/82DG-VCKS. 
44 See Non-Binding Disposition Guidance § 2.1, Manual for Courts-Martial 2019, App 
2.1-2 [hereinafter MCM].  
45 UCMJ art. 137(d). 





advocates are to serve as Article 32, Preliminary Hearing Officers, 
whenever practicable.46  
IV. THE UCMJ, THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, AND 
REGULATIONS RECOGNIZE THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE 
COMMANDER IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. IN GENERAL 
The UCMJ 47  and the Manual for Courts-Martial 48  entrust 
commanders at all levels in the chain of command with responsibility 
for the military justice system. In the Army regulation that defines 
and describes the nature of command responsibility, there is a not-
so-subtle link between the UCMJ and the “purpose of military 
discipline” related to the “controls and obligations imposed on them 
by virtue of their military Service.”49 Furthermore, “[c]ommanders 
are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do.”50 
Congress, and not just the President, also weighs in on the scale and 
scope of this responsibility. Section 3583 of Title 10 of the United 
States Code, detailing the requirements for a commanding officer’s 
exemplary conduct, reads: 
All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army 
are required ... [t]o show in themselves a good example of 
virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination ... [t]o be 
vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are 
placed under their command, ... [t]o guard against and 





46 See RCM 405(d)(A). 
47 UCMJ arts. 1-146a. 
48 See generally MCM.  
49 See Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy, para. 1-5c.(4)(b)). 
50 Id. para. 2-1b. 





according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all 
persons who are guilty of them, ... [t]o take all necessary and 
proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs 
of the Army, [and] [t]o promote and safeguard the morale, 
the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the 
officers and enlisted persons under their command or 
charge.51 
The commander’s critical role in the system has been part of this 
country’s military justice system since the founding of the country.52 
“The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in 
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to 
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, 
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United 
States.”53 The commander’s critical role in the system has been part 
of this country’s military justice system since the founding of the 
country.54 Commanders must have substantial authority, especially 
in combat situations, because it may be necessary to order military 
personnel to accomplish hazardous missions. The burden must be on 
the proponent of any limitation of the commander’s authority to 
justify the limitation because limitations on the commander’s 
authority automatically detract from the effectiveness of units in 
combat.  
Commanders for hundreds of years have praised the attributes 
of good order and discipline and its positive impact on combat 





51 10 U.S.C. § 3583. 
52 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the 
court-martial).  
53 MCM, pt. I, ¶ 3.  
54 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at §§ 1-4 to 1-6 (10th ed. 2018) (discussing history of the 
court-martial and discussing role of commanders in the system throughout that 
history).  





soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures 
success to the weak, and esteem to all.” 55 More recently, General 
William Westmorland commented:  
Discipline is an attitude of respect for authority which is 
developed by leadership, precept, and training. It is a state 
of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no 
matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be 
performed. Discipline conditions the soldier to perform his 
military duty even if it requires him to act in a way that is 
highly inconsistent with his basic instinct for self-
preservation. Discipline markedly differentiates the soldier 
from his counterpart in civilian society. Unlike the order that 
is sought in civilian society, military discipline is absolutely 
essential in the Armed Forces.56 
The Army Field Manual defined “disciplined soldiers” as 
“orderly, obedient, controlled, and dependable. They do their duty 
promptly and effectively in response to orders, or even in the absence 
of orders.”57 Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, Jr., said:  
The essential characteristics of a good army are that it be well 
trained and well disciplined. These two characteristics are 
apparent in every unit achievement, whether in peace or war. 
Discipline derives and flows from training and serves to 





55 U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington takes command of Continental Army 
in 1775, (Apr. 15, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/WY5F-WAHW. 
56 General (Retired) William C. Westmoreland, Military Justice—A 
Commander’s Viewpoint, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1971-1972). 
57 Army Field Manual 22-100, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, 
DC, (July 31, 1990) 42. 





training. That training is all encompassing. Training 
permeates everything a military organization does.58 
Additionally, commanders should be held accountable for 
ensuring subordinates are disciplined for sexual assault offenses and 
shifting that responsibility outside the chain of command will reduce 
command emphasis on enforcing standards of good order and 
discipline.  
B. UNDER THE CURRENT AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, THE COMMANDER’S PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IS BROAD 
Military courts have recognized that the commander is vested 
with broad discretion to decide how to best deal with discipline 
problems in his or her command.59 As noted supra, the commander’s 
options range from no action, verbal counseling, administrative 
actions (such as a written letter of reprimand in the service member’s 
file), or an administrative discharge, and even punitive actions such 
as nonjudicial punishment or court-martial charges.60 Decisions on 
serious allegations are made after consulting with the Staff Judge 
Advocate or a military prosecutor, who are themselves members of 
the command.61 The Staff Judge Advocate is expected to provide 





58 Id. at 49 (citing Arthur S. Collins, Jr., Common Sense Training. San Rafael, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1978). 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 365 (C.M.A. 1983) (commenting on the 
authority to charge violations of the UCMJ, court indicated that the “convening 
authority … is free to decide the number of offenses to charge….” The convening 
authority decides what charges, if any, of those preferred should be referred to trial); 
United States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (C.M.A. 1987) (courts are hesitant to review 
decisions whether to prosecute, and there is a strong presumption that convening 
authorities perform their function without bias). 
60 See RCM 306. 
61 See UCMJ art. 30. 





criminal activity, the availability and admissibility of evidence 
against the accused, the needs of the command, the time necessary to 
investigate and prosecute the case, and the likely outcome of a trial 
on the merits.62 Those are the types of decisions that local district 
attorneys and United States Attorneys make on a daily basis.63 
However, in the military that decision is for the commander to 
make, and not the lawyer. That is because the commander, not the 
lawyer, is responsible for morale as well as good order and discipline 
within the command.64 
C. UNDER THE CURRENT AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE COMMANDER HAVE 
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS OR HER LEGAL 
ADVISORS 
Under the current system, Staff Judge Advocates serve as legal 
advisors for the commanders of major commands, and for the 
subordinate commands. It is critical the commanders trust and 
confide in those legal advisors on matters involving military justice, 
which in turn impact morale and good order and discipline. That 
trust and confidence inures to the overall benefit of the command 





62 See UCMJ art. 37 (before convening a general court-martial the convening authority 
must consider the advice of the staff judge advocate). This legal advice is generally 
referred to as the “pretrial advice.” SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 7-3(A) (10th ed. 2018). 
63  Definition: District Attorney (DA), Legal Information Institute, archived at 
https://perma.cc/W39Y-EW8H (last visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
64 See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (“a commander is charged with maintaining 
morale, discipline, and readiness”); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (holding 
“nothing in the Constitution . . . disables a military commander from acting to avert 
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on 
the base under his command.”); Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 
401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971) (holding it is “[t]he responsibility of the military commander 
for maintenance of order in his command and his authority to maintain that order.”). 





their legal advisors in matters far beyond military justice, such as 
operational law, international agreements, and important military 
and civilian personnel matters. 
The proposed amendments establish a legal office outside the 
chain of command that decides disposition of serious, non-military 
offenses and would eliminate a major connection between legal 
advisors and commanders. The commander’s legal advisor and the 
convening authority would have no reason to meet to discuss 
decisions about disposition of these offenses. The absence of these 
direct, professional contacts would undermine this critical 
relationship, not only in regard to military justice matters, but also 
with respect to the broader legal issues commanders face at military 
installations both in the United States and when deployed. 
V. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE A 
COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN GOOD 
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 
A. THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY 
JUSTICE SYSTEM—GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 
It is critical that Congress, in considering any amendments to the 
UCMJ, recall that the primary function and purpose of the military 
justice system is to enforce good order and discipline in the armed 
forces.65  
Traditionally, those who view military justice as primarily a 
system of justice tend to see the commander’s role as a hindrance to 





65 See David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL. 
L. REV. 1 (2013) (presenting historical and contemporary analysis of purpose and 
functions of military justice and concluding that primary purpose of military justice 
has always been, and should remain, enforcement of good order and discipline).  
66 See supra note 2. 





system as primarily one for maintaining good order and discipline 
instead see the commander’s role as indispensable. 67  In Curry v. 
Secretary of the Army, 68  the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the role 
of the convening authority in taking various actions in a court-
martial case was constitutional. The court stated: 
The power of the convening authority to refer charges to the 
court-martial is justifiable on two grounds. First, 
prosecutorial discretion may be essential to efficient use of 
limited supplies and manpower. The decision to employ 
resources in a court-martial proceeding is one particularly 
within the expertise of the convening authority who, as chief 
administrator as well as troop commander, can best weigh 
the benefits to be gained from such a proceeding against 
those that would accrue if men and supplies were used 
elsewhere. The balance struck is crucial in times of crisis 
when prudent management of scarce resources is at a 
premium. Second . . . maintenance of discipline and order is 
imperative to the successful functioning of the military. The 
commanding officer’s power to refer charges may be 
necessary to establish and to preserve both.  
Most of the governing rules and regulations in the military 
justice system attempt to balance the need for justice and discipline.69 
More recently, critics have accused commanders of failing to ensure 
prosecution of those accused of sexual assault. Despite the views of 





67 See Schlueter, supra note 65. 
68 595 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Littrice, 13 C.M.R. 43, 47 (C.M.A. 1953) (identifying “the 
necessity of maintaining a delicate balance between justice and discipline.”). 





system of justice, the system’s function and purpose have not 
changed since the original Articles of War were adopted in the 
1700s.70  Establishment of the current system’s framework in 1950 
occurred only after numerous congressional hearings and multiple 
studies, and that system has fared well. Notably, the United States 
Supreme Court recently stated in Ortiz v. United States71 that “[t]he 
procedural protections afforded to a service member are ‘virtually 
the same’ as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether 
state or federal.”72  
Notwithstanding all of the reforms that have taken place since 
the founding of the nation, the American military justice system 
remains a system designed to enforce discipline and good order.73 
Based on the low levels of prosecutions of sexual assault offenses 
in the nations of several allies that have implemented the proposed 
changes, the evidence does not support the theory that the change 
will increase the level of U.S. military sexual assault prosecutions. 
Because the United States military has an excellent reputation as a 
combat-effective organization, the proponent for change should have 
the burden of proving there is first of all a problem with military 
prosecutions of sexual assaults, and the proposed remedy has a 
reasonable probability of accomplishing the goal without creating 
new problems. The proposed changes would be a severe and 
unnecessary blow to the commander’s authority to enforce good 





70 See Schlueter, supra note 65. 
71 138 S.Ct. 2165 (2018). 
72 Id. at 2174 (2018) (citing SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1–7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)). 
73 See id. at 2200 (“it is possible today to mistake a military tribunal for a regular court 
and thus to forget its fundamental nature as an instrument of military discipline”) 
(emphasis added); Schlueter, supra note 65. 





militaries, the change likely would result in fewer prosecutions of 
perpetrators of serious crimes, including sexual assaults.  
B. COMPARISON TO CIVILIAN PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS 
The proposed amendments to Article 30, UCMJ, which would 
remove the commander as the decision maker in the military justice 
process, would undermine the commander’s broad prosecutorial 
discretion and would transfer the local commander’s decision to an 
unspecified command structure outside the commander’s chain of 
command, requiring the recommendations of a senior armed forces 
lawyer, an individual disconnected in time and space from the 
command.74 Such a modification would be tantamount to informing 
a local district attorney that the decision to prosecute or not prosecute 
serious cases would be made in the state capital by the State Attorney 
General, or in the case of a federal criminal prosecution, in 
Washington D.C.—and that the decision would be binding on local 
authorities. Not only would that system undermine the effectiveness 
of the district attorney’s and United States Attorney’s offices, it 
would undermine the populace’s confidence in the ability of local 
authorities to take care of local crime. The same is true in the military, 
with commanders. Once members of a command discover that a 
person with no connection to the command is making the decision 
regarding court-martial charges, they will view the commander as 






74 See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring 
disposition of charges be referred to designated commissioned officers in grade O–6 
or higher). 
75 See generally Victor M. Hansen, The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of 
Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 229, 
 





C. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD RESULT IN 
ACADEMIC OR IVORY TOWER DECISIONS 
Because a high-ranking lawyer outside the command would be 
making decisions concerning serious court-martial charges, some 
may view that exercise as primarily “academic,” being disconnected 
from the real-world problems of the command—a true “ivory tower” 
decision.76 
The decision to prosecute almost always involves an armed 
forces prosecutor personally interviewing potential witnesses, 
reviewing the law enforcement reports, speaking personally to the 
commanders in the chain of command, and providing an informed 
“on the ground” assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
case against an accused. 77  In deciding whether to prosecute an 
accused, the prosecutor must make an informed assessment of 
whether the available evidence supports the charges alleged. 78 
Experienced litigators know that a case which looks strong on paper 
can take on a different light after they personally interview witnesses 
face-to-face, go over their pretrial statements, assess their demeanor, 
and then decide whether they will be strong or weak witnesses. 
Depending on the location of any central legal center charged with 
deciding whether to go forward with charges, counsel in that office 
will miss that opportunity. Most of those critical elements in the 
decision-making process would be missing if the primary decision 





266 (2013) (noting potential adverse impact on discipline if personnel perceive that 
their commander is not able to punish them). 
76 Ivory Tower Definition, Dictionary.com (2021), archived at https://perma.cc/YP9R-
7YXJ (defining an ivory tower as “an attitude of aloofness from or disdain or disregard 
for worldly or practical affairs”). 
77  SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing factors that 
commanders are to consider in preferring court-martial charges). 
78 Id. 





real-world problems of that particular command. Electronic 
evidence, memos, and e-mails are not an adequate substitute for a 
decision made by the local commander after a careful assessment by 
the commander’s local legal advisor. Thus, there is a real danger that 
the senior armed forces lawyers would be making an ivory-tower 
assessment of the evidence. 
D. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD UNDERMINE THE 
CHAIN OF COMMAND 
Under the current system, as discussed supra, it is the unit or com-
pany commander who usually initiates the charging process by ask-
ing the prosecutor assigned to their unit to prepare a charge sheet, 
i.e., “preferring charges.”79 Usually, a decision is made after consult-
ing the prosecutor assigned to that unit.80 Each commander in the 
chain of command is charged with considering the possible charges 
and providing another level of assessment before it reaches the desk 
of the commander who would be the convening authority on the 
case.81 The proposed changes to the system are clearly intended to 
disrupt the normal chain of command, and potentially create doubt 
in the minds of the service members whether the commander has any 
real disciplinary authority over them. One commentator has noted 





79 Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges. RCM 307(a). Charges are 
preferred through use of a charge sheet, DD Form 458. Charge sheets are typically 
prepared by the legal office after conferring with the accused’s commander; the 
commander then signs the charge sheet, and swears or affirms that he or she has 
personal knowledge of the charges, or has investigated them, and that they are true. 
RCM 307(a)(2).  
80 SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 6-1(A)(3) (10th ed. 2018) (noting that commanders 
usually seek advice from the military prosecutor). 
81 See id. at § 6-2 (discussing forwarding of charges through summary court-martial 
convening authority and the special court-martial convening authority to the general 
court-martial convening authority). 





would seriously undermine that commander's authority within the 
unit; in future cases the members of the unit might question or doubt 
the commander's ability to initiate disciplinary proceedings against 
them.82 At most the immediate commander would be able to make a 
non-binding recommendation to the referral authority about initia-
tion and disposition of offenses. 
Under the proposals, the decision to prosecute or not prosecute 
would be made completely out of the chain of command, and not by 
the very commanders and lawyers who are in the best position to 
make decisions that directly affect good order and discipline in that 
command. Thus, the proposals would undermine the authority of the 
commander to enforce discipline and justice in his or her unit. 
E. FOR PURPOSES OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE, 
THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMMON LAW 
OFFENSES AND MILITARY OFFENSES 
In stripping the commander of the discretion to dispose of 
serious offenses, the proposed changes appear to distinguish what 





82 See generally Victor M. Hansen, The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of 
Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 229, 
266 (2013). See also LTC Kyle G. Phillips, Military Justice and the Role of the Convening 
Authority, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol. 146/5/1,407, May 2020, where the author writes: 
The authority to administer discipline and hold people accountable is 
woven into the fabric of the military system. Training, unit culture, esprit de 
corps, and shared goals are essential for a healthy unit. The authority to 
discipline and hold people accountable under the law is the backbone of 
command authority. Stripping court-martial convening authority from 
command authority would have the effect of severing the spinal cord—the 
other movements of the “body” will be severely limited if not completely 
incapacitated.  
Archived at https://perma.cc/73NV-R9FE. 
83 See SCHLUETER ET AL., supra note 19 at § 3.2 (3d ed. 2018) (providing an overview of 
military crimes, including common law offenses and military-specific crimes). 





purposes of the military justice system, that distinction is 
meaningless. In Solorio v. United States, 84  the Supreme Court 
concluded that a court-martial had jurisdiction to try a Coast Guard 
member who committed sexual misconduct offenses that occurred in 
the civilian community. Among other sources, the Supreme Court 
quoted General George Washington’s General Order dated February 
24, 1779 which states: 
All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or 
soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well 
as subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of 
military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the 
other.85  
This reasoning remains just as valid today as it did when General 
Washington wrote it over 240 years ago. Service members who 
commit common law crimes such as larceny (Art. 121), sexual assault 
(Art. 120), and murder (Art. 118), pose as much of a threat to good 
order and discipline as do the crimes of desertion (Art. 85), 
disobedience of an order (Art. 90), and conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman (Art. 133), 86  and as such, are all proper 





84 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
85 Id. at 445 n.10 (citing 14 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 140-141 (J. Fitzpatrick 
ed. 1936)). 
86 See e.g., United States v. Morgan; 40 C.M.R. 583, 586 (A.B.R. 1969) (“That a ‘barracks 
thief’ creates problems for a unit commander is . . . common knowledge within the 
military community.”). Most members of the military community, enlisted and 
officers, understand the real danger to discipline and morale in a unit where an 
accused has stolen a possession from a fellow service member in arms. It can 
undermine trust and confidence in the ranks—qualities that are indispensable for 
good order and discipline.  





F. THE PROBLEM OF MIXED OFFENSES 
The proposed amendments create another issue when the 
accused has committed multiple offenses—some of which are in the 
excluded list of offenses (e.g., military offenses) and some of which 
are on the included list (e.g., common-law offenses). Under the 
proposals, who will make the ultimate decision to proceed with 
court-martial charges in these mixed cases? For example, an accused 
may be charged with sexual assault, conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman, and disobedience of an order of a superior officer 
to avoid contact with the sexual assault victim. Is that a decision for 
the commander? Or the senior legal officer unconnected with the 
command? Under the current system, that decision is made 
efficiently by the local command without regard to whether the 
offense is military in nature or a civilian-type offense. Additionally, 
if the commander proceeds with offering the accused a summary 
court-martial or nonjudicial punishment for the “purely” military 
offenses, but the accused decides to demand trial by court-martial, 
who will refer that case? (See Section VII, infra.). 
The proposed system creates a needless and complicated 
bifurcated system and an additional level of bureaucracy that in all 
likelihood will present unintended consequences.  
G. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS THREATEN THE ABILITY 
TO HOLD THE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
OFFENSES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND 
Furthermore, if commanders no longer have the necessary 
disciplinary role in preferring charges or referring them to trial for 
service members’ misconduct, it could be difficult to hold them 
personally responsible for the delicts of the service members under 
their command. 
CEOs of large organizations know that responsibility for the 
organization must be accompanied by the authority to manage the 
organization. To an even greater extent, the same holds true in the 
military, because commanders make life and death decisions on the 





battlefield. They should be held accountable for their inability to 
enforce good order and discipline, prospects which are undermined 
by the proposed amendments.  
 
H. THE AMENDMENTS APPARENTLY REINSTITUTE 
PROCEDURES LONG-SINCE ABANDONED FOR 
APPOINTING THE PARTICIPANTS TO A COURT-
MARTIAL 
In the early days of the UCMJ, if a convening authority referred 
court-martial charges to trial, that officer also appointed the members 
of the court-martial panel, the trial counsel, and the defense counsel. 
Over the years, the procedures changed. Now, the convening 
authority appoints only the panel members who will serve as the 
finders of fact at the court-martial. 87  They are the military’s 
counterpart to jurors for a state or federal criminal case. The military 
judge is assigned to the case by the independent Service’s trial 
judiciary command.88 The defense counsel is assigned to represent 
an accused by an independent chain of command for defense 
counsel.89 The trial counsel (prosecutor) is selected by the Staff Judge 
Advocate.90  
Thus, the proposed amendments appear to reinstate a system 
that has not existed in many years. It would apparently require the 
Service Chiefs of Staff, located in the Pentagon, to create an office to 





87 UCMJ art. 25. 
88 RCM 503(b)(1). 
89 For example, in the Army defense counsel are appointed by the Chief, United States 
Army Trial Defense Service or his delegee. Army Regulations 27-10, para. 6-9. 
90  See Army Regulations 27-10, para. 5-3 (detailing of trial counsel by Staff Judge 
Advocate or his delegee). 





judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. 91  That leaves a clear 
impression with the accused, and members of the public, that the 
system has reverted to the day when it appeared that the court-
martial was stacked against the accused. In contrast to those 
proposals, no United States Attorney or district attorney in the 
civilian criminal justice systems has authority to select these trial 
participants for cases being tried by their offices.  
This scheme of someone other than an officer in the service’s 
judiciary command making the appointment of a judge to a 
particular court-martial could be perceived as the command hand-
picking a judge, and thus impacting the impartiality and 
independence of the military judge. It could certainly be attacked in 
the courts as depriving an accused of due process.92 
VI. THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD CREATE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
A. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: COMMANDER’S 
INABILITY TO IMPOSE NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT OR 
CONVENE SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL 
Under the proposed amendments to Article 30, a decision by a 





91 See The Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1932, 116th Cong. (2020) (requiring 
“[e]ach Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces or Commandant” to “establish an office to 
. . . convene general and special courts-martial” and detail the members of courts-
martial). 
92 Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 180 (1994) (“Article 26 places military judges 
under the authority of the appropriate Judge Advocate General rather than under the 
authority of the convening officer. . . . [W]e believe this structure helps protect 
[judicial] independence. . . . Judge Advocates General . . . have no interest in the 
outcome of a particular court-martial . . . .”). The problem could arise where someone 
in the prosecutorial chain of command believed that a particular military judge was 
lenient on sentencing convicted service members and the appointing authority picked 
a judge who was more inclined to impose harsher punishments. 





commander’s ability to deal with the alleged offenses in some other 
forum. For example, the amendment indicates that a decision not to 
proceed with court-martial charges would not limit the ability of the 
commander to proceed with a summary court-martial 93  or 
nonjudicial punishment.94 But that creates potential problems with 
actual implementation. Article 15 provides that unless a service 
member is attached to a vessel, the service member can turn down 
the commander’s proposed Article 15 procedures and demand a 
court-martial. The same is true for a summary court-martial; the 
accused must consent, whether or not the accused is assigned or 
attached to a vessel. If the commander offers the accused an Article 
15 for certain offenses, or prefers summary court-martial charges, the 
accused can refuse to proceed, and the centralized legal authority 
could choose to prohibit a court-martial for those offenses. Thus, the 
accused can effectively “check-mate” the commander from enforcing 
decisions to conduct a summary court-martial or impose nonjudicial 
punishment under Article 15. 
B. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: DECIDING WHETHER TO 
IMPOSE PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT 
Under the current system, a commander may place an accused 
in pretrial confinement pending disposition of the charges. 95  The 
system provides for both command review and judicial review of 
that decision by a military magistrate or judge.96 The current system 
is an integrated and coordinated decision by the chain of command, 
which in large part depends on the probable disposition of the 





93 UCMJ art. 24. 
94 UCMJ art. 15. 
95 RCM 305. 
96 Id. 





case to trial out of the chain of command—creates uncertainty as to 
whether that current system of dealing with pretrial confinement 
issues can be maintained because the immediate commander will no 
longer be the person who decides whether there is probable cause 
that the person being confined committed the offense.97 The function 
of deciding that sufficiency of the evidence will be transferred to the 
centralized legal authority, and having one Department of Defense 
(DOD) entity put the accused into pretrial confinement and another 
DOD entity refuse to initiate charges would be incongruous, 
inefficient, and reflect poorly on the immediate commander or the 
centralized legal authority or both.  
C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
COULD PRESENT SPEEDY TRIAL PROBLEMS 
The military justice system currently recognizes several speedy 
trial protections—constitutional, statutory, and regulatory.98 Those 
protections are triggered by the preferral of court-martial charges 
and/or pretrial confinement of the accused. Under the current 
system commanders and legal advisors work together to ensure that 
the case moves in a timely and efficient manner. Vesting the decision 
to refer charges to a court-martial in a legal office, separated by time 





97 See generally, MCM; RCM 305(d):  
When a person may be confined. No person may be ordered into pretrial 
confinement except for probable cause. Probable cause to order pretrial 
confinement exists when there is a reasonable belief that: (1) An offense 
triable by court-martial has been committed; (2) The person confined 
committed it; and (3) Confinement is required by the circumstances. 
98 See SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 13-3(D) (10th ed. 2018) (discussing speedy trial 
rights available to a military accused under the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth 
Amendment, the UCMJ, and the Manual for Courts-Martial). 





D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT PLEA BARGAINING 
As in the civilian community, the military justice system depends 
heavily on the ability of a convening authority and an accused to 
enter into a pretrial agreement.99 Those agreements typically require 
the accused to enter a plea of guilty in return for reduction of charges, 
dismissal of some of the charges, or a sentence limitation. 100  The 
proposed amendments fail to address that critical feature of the 
system. If the centralized legal authority decides to proceed with 
court-martial charges, that decision is binding on any convening 
authority. Does that mean that a convening authority could not 
subsequently enter into plea bargaining with the accused which 
results in the dismissal of a serious charge? The answer to that 
question does not lie in drafting additional statutory language, nor 
in directing the President to solve the problem through a myriad of 
amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial or existing Service 
regulations—those measures would simply add a level of 





99 See generally Bradford D. Bigler, A New Paradigm for Plea Agreements Under the 2016 
MJA, ARMY LAW. no. 6, 2019, at 48 (in-depth discussion of changes to plea bargaining 
after 2016 Military Justice Act; author compares the “legacy” system of plea bargaining 
to the new system; the author notes that if the accused pleads guilty to all charges and 
specifications, the judge sentences the accused at an Article 39(a) session); Joseph P. 
Della Maria, Jr., Negotiating and Drafting the Pretrial Agreement, 25 JAG J. 117 (1971); 
Gray, Negotiated Pleas in the Military, 37 Fed. B.J. 49 (1978); Bruce A. Haddenhorst & 
Maryalice David, Guilty Pleas: A Primer for Judge Advocates, 39 A.F. L. REV. 87 (1996); 
Carlton L. Jackson, Plea Bargaining in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 179 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2004); Donald F. Melhorn, Jr., 
Negotiating Pleas in Naval Courts-Martial, 16 JAG J. 103 (1962); Brian B. McMenamin, Plea 
Bargaining in the Military, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93 (1971). For a sample pretrial 
agreement, see K. JANSEN ET AL., MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FORMS, § 4-9 (3d ed. 
2009). 
100 See RCM 705.  





E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE: THE PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT AGREEMENTS 
WITH LOCAL CIVILIAN PROSECUTORS 
At many installations there are agreements with local 
prosecutors (state and federal) as to which office—military or 
civilian—will prosecute an accused. 101  Those agreements are 
beneficial in promoting good community relations between the local 
command and the surrounding civilian community. The proposed 
amendments make no provision for such agreements. Is it intended 
that after the Judge Advocate General’s Corps Colonel (O-6) or Navy 
Captain (O-6) legal advisor decides to prosecute a case, the local 
agreements are no longer operative? Would the O-6 be bound by 
such agreements? Is the O-6 required to contact the local civilian 
prosecutor and decide on the next best steps? In either event, the local 
command would have no authority to resolve the issues, even 






101 See MCM, App. 4. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of 
Justice and Transportation (Coast Guard) Relating to the Investigations and 
Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two Departments Have Concurrent 
Jurisdiction; see also Office of the District Attorney, 27th Judicial District of Texas, Bell 
County (“Through an agreement with the Commanding General for III Corps and Fort 
Hood, virtually all felony cases involving military defendants are deferred to the 
Army for prosecution by court martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. An 
aggressive liaison program between the III Corps Staff Judge Advocate’s office and 
the District Attorney’s Office insures that common problems are dealt with 
effectively.”), archived at https://perma.cc/BN89-KV93. Several cases illustrate the 
three jurisdictions that may choose to prosecute a case. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 
527 U.S. 373 (1999) (army retiree, convicted of kidnapping a private from an Air Force 
base and murdering her, sentenced to death by a district court); United States v. 
Hennis, 79 M.J. 370 (CAAF 2020) (former Army member, convicted of murdering the 
wife and two daughters of an Air Force captain, sentenced to death by an Army court-
martial); United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (CAAF 1999) (servicemember, convicted of 
two murders, sentenced to life in prison by a state court). 





For example, in the current system if a commander elects not to 
refer sexual offenses to courts-martial, a superior convening 
authority may refer the offense to courts-martial. If the offense 
occurred on a military installation with exclusive federal jurisdiction, 
the United States Attorney may prosecute the case in a United States 
District Court. If the offense occurred elsewhere in the United States, 
a district attorney could prosecute the case. Thus, the commander’s 
decision not to prosecute does not end the case—there may still be 
prosecution in other venues. 
VII. CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LOOK TO OTHER COUNTRIES’ 
SYSTEMS AS MODELS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE 
UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THOSE FOREIGN 
SYSTEMS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE  
A. IN GENERAL 
The proposed amendments seem to rest on the view that first, 
military commanders are not to be trusted in exercising prosecutorial 
discretion,102 and second, that Congress should follow the lead of 
other countries and adopt procedures used in countries such as 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. That argument is 
reminiscent of debates over whether other countries’ laws should 
serve as a model for American legal systems. In hearings on earlier 
similar legislative proposals, some commentators have urged 
Congress to go further and apply this approach to the prosecution of 
all cases by civilian prosecutors. The argument is that the United 
States’ military justice system is an “outlier” that is somehow 





102 Cf. Don Christensen, A Comment on the Latest White Paper, Global Military Justice 
Reform (July 26, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/F8MG-LVNY (suggesting that 
commanders are not capable of making decisions about which cases should be tried 
by court-martial).  





countries are designed to suit the political and military goals of those 
particular countries, and those democratic countries are profoundly 
different from the United States in numbers of military personnel, 
military budgets, and worldwide size and type of military 
operations. There may be aspects of those systems that could be 
effectively applied to the United States military. However, before 
changes from our allies are applied to the United States military they 
should at least meet a threshold showing that they are applied to 
prosecute enough cases to show they are indeed effective. 
The American military justice system is similar to the civilian 
justice system. 103  This procedural similarity makes the military 
justice system easier for civilians to understand, and the same 
rationale for decentralized decisions for most prosecutions has the 
same basis in both systems. Civilians recognize that a decentralized 
decision whereby local district attorneys and U.S. attorneys decide 
whether a person is charged is best for fairness because local 
circumstances are considered. There is no need to look to other 
countries for guidance on who should make the charging decision 
for the military any more than one should seek foreign guidance on 
whether authority to prosecute should be shifted to a centralized 
authority for civilians.  
Dramatic changes should not be considered before the evidence 
establishes there is a problem in the military’s prosecution of sexual 
assault offenses. Any change that is made should not be made before 
there has been testing and analysis. Allied militaries in democracies 
that complete a handful of sexual assault prosecutions provide 
limited anecdotal evidence at best and do not support change for the 





103 Cf. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2174 (2018) (“[t]he procedural protections 
afforded to a service member are ‘virtually the same’ as those given in a civilian 
criminal proceeding, whether state or federal.”) (citing SCHLUETER, supra note 1 at § 1–
7, p. 50 (10th ed. 2018)). 





United States commanders are professional, well trained and 
highly educated.104 Those who fail to perform are usually removed 
from command or denied valued promotions. 105  Lawyers who 
advise them also are well trained and highly educated, and there are 
consequences if they fail to perform. Before Congress gives any 
serious consideration to adopting the procedures used in other 
countries, it should compare those systems in terms of size of the 
military force, the world-wide and geographical disbursement of 
military personnel, purpose of those military justice systems, the 
history and experience of those systems, and the country’s 
expectations for its commanders in enforcing good order and 
discipline. 
Commentators have written that “[t]he [foremost] distinctive 
factor that separates the United States military from all other 





104 See generally Kimberly Jackson et. al., Raising the Flag: Implications of U.S. Military 
Approaches to General and Flag Officer Development, 30–44 (Rand Corporation, 2020), 
archived at https://perma.cc/Y5FW-JHB (detailing military assignment history, 
professional military and civilian education, special training, and evaluation 
requirements of officers in the Armed Forces). 
105 For example, in December 2020, 14 Army leaders at Fort Hood, Texas, including 
two major generals were suspended or relieved from command after an investigation 
determined that they had a command climate that “allowed sexual assault and 
harassment to proliferate, and that Army CID agents at the post were under-
experienced and over-assigned.” Kyle Rempfer, Fourteen leaders relieved or suspended 
after scathing report on Fort Hood, ARMY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/KLR3-R7FB. See also Report of the Fort Hood Independent Review 
Committee, U.S. ARMY iii, 64, 75 (Nov. 6, 2020) (noting problems with the handling of 
victims, deficiencies in the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention 
(SHARP) Program, inexperienced investigators, and “a large number of sexual assault 
cases were lost or dismissed at court-martial partially due to investigations that are 
rote and lack essential evidence.”), archived at https://perma.cc/QEH3-DMNR. 
106 CRAIG CARUANA, AMERICAN POWER: STILL THE BEST HOPE FOR PEACE 77 (2012).  





the only country that can project military might globally.”107 “The 
military justice system . . . goes wherever the troops go–to provide 
uniform treatment regardless of locale or circumstances.”108 Given 
the global nature of America’s armed forces, commanders must have 
the ability to “expeditiously deal with misconduct to prevent 
degradation of the unit’s effectiveness and cohesion.”109 
Legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
has stated that:  
While many countries can afford for the center of the[ir] 
military justice systems to be located . . . far from the arenas 
of international armed conflict, we require a more flexible 
capability that can travel with the unit as it operates in any 
part of the world.110 Any delay in “disciplinary action will 





107 Stephen Calabresi, “A Shining City On A Hill”: American Exceptionalism And The 
Supreme Court’s Practice Of Relying On Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (2006) 
(quoting JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: 
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2004)).  
108 James B. Roan and Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New 
Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 185, 191 (2002).  
109 Id. 
110 Report of the role of the Commander Subcomm. to the Response Systems to Adult Sexual 
Assault Crimes Panel 108 (2014), archived at https://perma.cc/N6LJ-9HFM (testimony 
of Brigadier General Richard C. Gross, U.S. Army).  
111 In this same vein the late Judge Robinson O. Everett, former Chief Judge of the 
Court of Military Appeals, cogently pointed out: “[J]ustice delayed is justice defeated. 
. . . In military life, where to maintain discipline, the unpleasant consequences of 
offenses must be quick, certain and vivid—not something vague in the remote future.” 
Id. (quoting ROBINSON O. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1956)). 





Finally, as discussed in the following sections, it is important to 
point out that the American military justice system deals with 
different types of caseloads.112 
Even assuming that there is some merit in adopting another 
country's approach to military justice, the burden is on the reformers 
to show that the American model is indeed lacking, and that 
adopting the other countries’ models will not adversely impact good 
order and discipline.  
B. STATISTICAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THREE COUNTRIES WHERE ATTORNEYS 
REFER CASES TO COURTS-MARTIAL  
On April 20, 2020, a Shadow Advisory Group (SAG) issued a 
report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House 
Armed Services Committee.113 The report addressed Section 540F of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 
No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 19, 2019) (FY20 NDAA), and noted 
(as mentioned previously) that Section 540F(b)(a)(3) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act directs a report containing, among other 
elements, 
(3) A comparative analysis of the military justice systems of 
relevant foreign allies with the current military justice 





112 As noted by the legal counsel to the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff: 
“[T]he scope and scale of our allies’ caseloads are vastly different than ours. None of 
our allies handle the volume of cases that the U.S. military does. This is likely due to 
the greater size of our military forces in comparison.” See Report of the role of the 
Commander, supra note 110. 
113  Shadow Advisory Report Group of Experts, Alternative Authority for Determining 
Whether to Prefer or Refer Charges for Felony Offenses Under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, Apr. 20, 2020 [hereinafter SAG Report]. 





justice system, including whether or not approaches of the 
military justice systems of such allies to determinations 
described in subsection (a) are appropriate for the military 
justice system of the United States.114 
The SAG Report indicated that 7 of 15 relevant allies do not 
prosecute non-military offenses, such as sexual assault, by courts-
martial during peace time that occur in their countries. 115  The 
remaining 8 allies utilize lawyers to charge offenses and refer them 
to trial.116 The military forces of two allies (Ireland and New Zealand) 
have fewer than 10,000 personnel in their militaries.117 Five allied 





114 See id. (addressing Section 540F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 19, 2019) (FY20 NDAA)). 
115 Id. at App. 16-17. As an example, Germany no longer has peacetime courts-martial. 
Criminal cases are tried in the civilian courts and charging decisions are made by 
regular civilian authorities. Venue for the trial of offenses by deployed personnel is 
centralized in the civilian court in Kempten, Bavaria. See Act for Venue for Armed 
Forces Under Special Deployment Abroad (Jan. 21, 2013). Additionally, Sweden no 
longer has courts-martial. Criminal offenses by military personnel are prosecuted by 
regular civilian authorities. See id. 
116 Id. 
117  Global Firepower Nations Index, Active Military Manpower (2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/L4SE-Y3AW. 
118 The authors did not include Israeli statistics because the most recent information 
they found available about Israeli sexual assault courts-martial was from 2013. 
Statistics from the Israeli Forces should be considered because Israel is a democracy, 
an ally of the United States, and has a military that has an outstanding reputation for 
competence. In 2013, Israel used the centralized prosecution referral system that is 
outside the chain of command. In 2013, the Israeli active duty population was 176,500 
or four times as large as the active duty population of Fort Hood. Yet in 2012, Fort 
Hood completed about the same number of military sex offense prosecutions as the 
entire Israeli Defense Force (Fort Hood tried 26 sex offense courts-martial in FY 2012; 
Israel averaged 23 indictments from 2008 to 2012). The 2013 study reported that “[t]he 
entire Australian military justice system prosecuted an average of three felony-level 
prosecutions the last two years; as compared to the U.S. military justice system that 
prosecutes approximately 400 times as many felony-level cases.” Schenck, L., Fact 
 





Kingdom—have militaries with personnel strengths between about 
60,000 and 150,000, 119  and the effectiveness of their prosecution 
systems could therefore be compared to that of the United States. 
Any assessment should consider the rates of sexual assault 
prosecutions and convictions, where available, and compare those 
rates with the rates of United States sexual assault courts-martial 
prosecutions and convictions. It may not be possible to assess the 
statistics of some of the allies because some of these countries might 
not maintain statistics. Others might be unwilling to disclose 
statistics on prosecutions.  
The SAG Report further states:  
The experience of other democratic countries that rely on 
courts-martial for the trial of serious offenses by military 
personnel with the charging power vested in a lawyer rather 
than a lay commander demonstrates that such a system can 
be put in place without compromising the effectiveness of 
the nation’s defense capability.120  
Notably, however, the SAG Report provides no measurement of 
the effect on defense capability of transferring authority from the 
commander to lawyers. The SAG Report does not give any examples 
where prosecutions of serious crimes were more effective than the 
current United States system where the convening authority refers 
cases to trial. The United States is known for its powerful and 





Sheet on Israeli Military Justice, 11 (Sept. 9, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/M9R8-
K9GA. 
119 Id. 
120 SAG Report supra note 113, at 13. 
121 President Barack Obama said in his farewell to the U.S. Armed Forces: 
 





emulate in many ways. None of our allies’ experiences have 
demonstrated that the dilution of the authority of the commander to 
enforce good order and discipline improved the effectiveness of their 
military. 
The Department of Defense “uses the term ‘sexual assault’ to 
refer to a range of crimes, including rape, sexual assault, forcible 
sodomy, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and 
attempts to commit these offenses, as defined by the [UCMJ].”122 In 
FY 2018, convening authorities referred 66% (378) cases (penetrative 
and contact sexual assaults) to trial by general, special, and summary 
court-martial, and in FY 2017, 64% (441) were referred to court-





America’s military remains by far the most capable fighting force on the face 
of the earth. Our Army, tested by years of combat, is the best-trained and 
best-equipped land force on the planet. 
 
Our Navy is the largest and most lethal in the world, on track to surpass 300 
ships. Our Air Force, with its precision and reach, is unmatched. Our Marine 
Corps is the world’s only truly expeditionary force. Our Coast Guard is the 
finest in the world. . . . [O]ur military stands apart as the most respected 
institution in our nation by a mile. 
Mahita Gajanan, President Obama's Farewell Address to the Armed Forces, TIME (Jan. 
4, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/CJ22-W5E4. On February 5, 2020, President 
Donald Trump said in his State of the Union Address, “Our military is completely 
rebuilt, with its power being unmatched anywhere in the world — and it is not even 
close.” Jim Garamone, Trump Touts Military Rebuilding, Space Force, Strikes Against 
Terror, DOD NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/YM7B-XKEX. See also 
Global Firepower 2021, archived at https://perma.cc/E5T8-JNNX (ranking the 
United States as the undisputed most powerful military, followed by Russia and China 
to complete the top three). 
122 Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: 
Fiscal Year 2019 (2020), at Appendix B [hereinafter 2019 SAPR Report], archived at 
https://perma.cc/YL2G-4ZNS.  
123 Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual 
Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) Court-Martial Adjudication Data Report 
(Nov. 2019) at 19 [hereinafter 2019 DAC-IPAD Report], archived at 
https://perma.cc/H7QZ-RYGZ. 





through alternate administrative means 34% (196) of preferred cases. 
Overall, 82% of referred cases in FY18 were referred to general court-
martial, and in FY 2017, 77% were referred to general courts-martial. 
The more serious the sexual assault offense, the higher the level of 
court-martial. General courts-martial (GCM) have authority to 
sentence the accused to multiple years of confinement, whereas 
special courts-martial sentences to confinement are limited to one 
year and summary courts-martial sentences are limited to 30 days. 
The following table shows referral levels for penetrative and contact 
sexual offense cases completed in Fiscal Years 2015 through 2018.124 
Table 1 
Referral Levels of Penetrative Offenses and Contact Offenses 
in United States Courts-Martial 
(2015-2018) 


















Lower Levels of Court-
Martial 
6% (23) 7% (27) 8% (25) 5% (15) 

































124 Id. at 17. 





The following table depicts the number of substantiated reports 
of sexual assault courts-martial cases tried to verdict, convictions of 
any offense, and confinement adjudged. 
Table 2 
Substantiated Reports of Sexual Assault in United States Courts-
Martial 
(2015-2019) 










4,584 4,591 5,110 5,805 5,699 
Cases Tried for any 
Offense 
543 389 406 307 363 











125 Department of Defense (DOD) Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: 
Fiscal Year 2015 49 (2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V9N9-VUSU.  
126 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military: Fiscal Year 
2016 (2017), at Appendix B, archived at https://perma.cc/RA67-RK38.  
127 DOD SAPR Report, DOD Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the 
Military, Appendix B Statistical Data on Sexual Assault at 15, 25, archived at 
https://perma.cc/F279-Y3BV.  
128 DOD SAPR Report, DOD Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the 
Military, Appendix B Statistical Data on Sexual Assault at 11, 24, archived at 
https://perma.cc/2FSD-N4Z3. 
129 See 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122.  
130 Restricted reports of sexual assault are confidential, protected communications. 
Unrestricted reports of sexual assault are referred for investigation to a military 
criminal investigative organization, and the command is notified of the alleged 
incident. 2019 SAPR Report, supra note 122, at 5, 11, 29. 





A series of studies have compared the rates of sexual assault 
felony-level prosecutions in the Canadian, Australia, and United 
Kingdom with those in the United States Armed Forces.131  
1. Canada 
One study concluded that more than twice as many United States 
personnel per capita were tried by courts-martial for sex offenses 
than for Canadian Forces, even though the United States sex offense 
report rate (assessed by military suspect) was 27% lower than the 
Canadian rate. In Fiscal Year 2012, a single United States military 
installation, Fort Hood, alone tried 3.7 times (26 Fort Hood versus 7 
Canada) as many sex offenses by courts-martial as the entire 
Canadian military, and obtained ten times (21 Fort Hood versus 2 
Canada) as many sex offense courts-martial convictions.  
The Canadian Armed Forces currently have 71,500 regular force 
members.132 The United States Armed Forces have approximately 20 
times more personnel than the Canadian Armed Forces. The number 
of Canadian courts-martial prosecutions with at least one sexual 
misconduct charge, and the number of convictions by reporting year 





131  Schenck, L., Fact Sheet on Canadian Military Justice (Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter 
Canada Fact Sheet], archived at https://perma.cc/9942-GFKK; Fact Sheet on United 
Kingdom Military Justice (Corrected), (Sept. 22, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/LGQ4-X8ZL; Schenck, L., Fact Sheet on Australian Military Justice 
(Sept. 13, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/G7QT-AUC3. 
132 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada (Sep. 24, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X7UZ-U5TV.  






Canadian Court-Martial Convictions 
(2013-2019) 
 
Year ’13-‘14 ’14-‘15 ’15-‘16 ’16-‘17 ’17-‘18 ’18-‘19 
Cases Tried 6 10 7 12 20 20 
Convictions 4 5 7 10 15 14 
 
During the 2018–2019 reporting period, Canada completed 20 
courts-martial involving sexual misconduct charges, and 14 resulted 
in a finding of guilt on at least one charge.133 Of the 20 personnel 
charged with sexual misconduct in 2018–2019, 6 were charged with 
sexual assault, and the other charges related to prostitution, child 
pornography, voyeurism, etc. None of the sexual assault charges 
resulted in a finding of guilty.134  
In the 2017–2018 reporting period, Canada also completed 20 
courts-martial involving sexual misconduct with 15 of those 
resulting in a guilty finding for at least one charge. However, there 
were only 9 charges involving sexual assault, and the other charges 
were for non-assault sexual crimes. Three were convicted of sexual 
assault and received sentences including imprisonment ranging 
from 9 to 22 months. In the entire Canadian military justice system 
during the 2018–2019 reporting period, 43 sentences were 





133 See Government of Canada, Judge Advocate General Annual Report 2018–2019 
Annex B (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/MLN2-TSFV; Director of Military 
Prosecutions, National Defense (Canada), Annual Report 2018–2019 50-56 (2019) 
[hereinafter Canadian 2018-2019 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/F9ET-
YXBZ; Director of Military Prosecutions, National Defence (Canada), Annual Report 
2017-2018 (2018), archived at https://perma.cc/XAS3-2EZT.  
134 Id. 





sentences to any imprisonment (5 days, 5 months, and 10 months 
respectively). A Canadian survey revealed that in 2018, “the 
prevalence of sexual assault among women in the Regular Force was 
about four times that among men (4.3% versus 1.1%)”and totaled 
“approximately 900 Regular Force members . . . representing 1.6% of 
all Regular Force members.”135 In 2018, a U.S. study estimated 1.5% 
of U.S. military personnel indicated they were sexually assaulted.136 
The Canadian study showing the number of sexual assaults 
committed by members of the Canadian armed forces may not be 
comparable to the latest U.S. study because of different survey 
methodology. For example, the response rate in the Canadian survey 
“among Regular Force members was 52%,”137 and the U.S. military 
personnel response rate was only 17%.138 A low response rate leads 
to the possibility of selection bias because victims of sexual assault 
are more likely to report in surveys that they have been sexually 
assaulted. Extrapolations from surveys with lower response rates are 
more likely to may be inflated because of this selection bias. Thus, we 
do not compare the total number of cases prosecuted divided by the 
total number of cases for Canada or the United States. We do have 





135 Adam Cotter, Sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces Regular Force, 
2018 [hereinafter Canadian Survey] (May 22, 2019) at 4, archived at 
https://perma.cc/G8MU-H25S.  
136 Annex 1: 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members 
Overview Report [hereinafter 2018 WGRA Report] (May 2019) at vi (”In 2018, 6.2% of 
DOD women (an estimated 12,927 Service members) and 0.7% of DOD men (an 
estimated 7,546 Service members) experienced a sexual assault in the past 12 months 
(Figure 1). This was a statistically significant increase, from 4.3% in 2016, for DOD 
women. There was no significant change from 2016 for DOD men.”), archived at 
https://perma.cc/824S-4MNB. To determine the total DOD victims of sexual assault 
in the previous 12 months, add 12,927 women plus 7,546 men equals 20,473. The 2018 
WGRA Report used a DOD population of 1,327,194. Id. at 19. Dividing the 1,327,194 
total population by 20,473 estimated victims of sexual assault equals 1.5%. 
137 Canadian Survey at 55. 
138 2018 WGRA Report at iv. 





the number of personnel in the Canadian military. There is no 
compelling evidence that U.S. military personnel commit more 
sexual assaults per capita than military personnel in any other 
country. In sum, during the last two years the Canadian prosecutor 
tried an average of 7.5 sexual assault cases each year and obtained an 
average of 1.5 convictions each year, which is a much lower rate per 
thousand than in the United States military justice system. 
2. Australia 
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has 58,680 active duty 
personnel, and the United States Armed Forces is 23 times as large as 
the ADF. 139  In the Australian military, the Director of Military 
Prosecutions (DMP), chooses the level of trial for each accused.140 
Trials by a Defense Force Magistrate (DFM) or Restricted Court-
Martial (RCM) have the power to impose a maximum sentence of six 
months’ imprisonment. An Australian general court-martial (GCM) 
may adjudge a sentence based on a particular offense of up to 
confinement for life. The 2019 DMP report notes that on December 3, 
2018, a captain was convicted of one count of sexual intercourse 
without consent by a GCM and his sentence included 3 months 
imprisonment. The 2017 DMP report states there was one GCM 
during 2017 for a trial of an accused on a charge of sexual intercourse 
without consent, and that accused was acquitted.141 The 2016 DMP 





139 Australian Government Department of Defense 2017–2018 Annual Report, Chapter 
7 Strategic Workforce Management, archived at https://perma.cc/KXT9-W9DK. 
140 Director of Military Prosecutions, Department of Defence, Australian Government, 
Report for the Period 01 January to 31 December 2019 21-24 (2020) [hereinafter 
Australian 2019 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/Q3U3-3FW2.  
141 Australian Government, Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2017 19, 
22 (2018) [hereinafter Australian 2017 DMP Report], archived at 
https://perma.cc/EKX9-3Y8J.  





Force Discipline Act] are acts of indecency. The more serious offences 
are generally dealt with by the civilian authorities unless such 
offending occurs overseas, where the Australian courts have no 
jurisdiction.”142  
The following table depicts the Australian DMP referral 
decisions for all cases and provides the number of sexual offenses 





142 Director of Military Prosecutions, Department of Defense, Australian Government, 
Report for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2016 24 (2017) [hereinafter Australian 
2016 DMP Report], archived at https://perma.cc/3W8H-7ZY4.  










Calendar Year 2016143 2017144 2018145 2019146 
No Adverse 
Action 
49 38 Not 
Available 
54 
Referred to unit 
for Summary 
Disposal 





36 32 33 42 
Restricted 
Court-Martial 
3 0 4 1 
General Court-
Martial  
















143 Id. at 22-23, 25, Annex B. 
144 Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, Annex B.  
145  The DMP webpage does not include the 2018 DMP Report. For the statistics 
provided, see Annex N to Judge Advocate General, Department of Defense, Australian 
Government, Defence Force Discipline Act 1982: Report for the Period 1 January to 31 
December 2018 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3DDT-PRRX.  
146 Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–22, Annex A. 





The Australian Inspector General Report states, “[s]uperior trials 
(courts martial and Defence Force magistrate trials) decreased by a 
further six per cent, a trend that has been observed over the past five 
financial years. In 2018-19 there were 30 superior trials recorded, 
compared to 32 trials recorded in 2017-18.”147  
In sum, only two Australian cases were tried at the general court-
martial level from 2016 to 2019, and one of them resulted in an 
acquittal of the accused. Both of those general courts-martial were for 
penetrative sexual assaults. 148  Australia should not be used for 
comparison with the United States as there were only two felony-
level sexual assault prosecutions (trial by general court-martial) in 
the previous four years, and only one general court-martial sexual 
assault conviction.149 
3. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s full-time trained strength as of October 1, 
2017 was 137,280.150 The United States Armed Forces has about 10 
times more active duty personnel than the United Kingdom. 





147 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Annual Report 01 July 2018 to 
30 June 2019 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NEV8-LNAT. 
148  Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–24 (stating one penetrative 
sexual assault was tried by general court-martial in December 2019 and resulted in a 
finding of guilty); Australian 2017 DMP Report, supra note 141, at 17, 22 (stating one 
allegation of sexual intercourse without consent was tried by general court-martial 
and resulted in an acquittal); Australian 2016 DMP Report, supra note 142, at 46 (did 
not describe any general courts-martial in 2017).  
149 Australian 2016 DMP Report, supra note 142, at 46; Australian 2017 DMP Report, 
supra note 141, at 17, 22; Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21–24. 
150  Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), UK Armed Forces Monthly Service 
Personnel Statistics 1 October 2017 (Nov. 16 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/K7BS-V4VA. See also Strength of British Military Falls for Ninth Year, 
BBC News (Aug. 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/WLB4-VUDV (indicating 
the strength of the U.K. military was 133,460). 





following numbers for military personnel prosecuted and convicted 
of sexual offenses and the most serious sexual offenses, rape or sexual 
assault, as depicted in the following table. According to United 
Kingdom statistics, if a defendant is charged with both rape and 
sexual assault, the defendant is counted as one person in each 
category. Thus, the number of persons prosecuted and convicted is 
somewhat lower than the numbers shown on the following table.  
Table 5 
United Kingdom Statistics for Investigations, Prosecu-
tions and  
Convictions for Sexual Assaults 
(2015-2018) 
 
Year 2015151 2016152 2017153 2018154 
Rape and Sexual Assault 
Investigations155  
69 86 93 109 
Prosecutions for Rape or 
Sexual Assault Offenses 
44 38 56 43 
Convictions for Rape or 
Sexual Assault 






151  Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice 
System: 2016 (2017), archived at https://perma.cc/36YJ-F6WB (information available 
in the Excel spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6).  
152 Id. 
153  Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice 
System: 2017 (Mar. 20, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/X2VS-YTZE (information 
available in the Excel Spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6).  
154  Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom), Sexual Offences in the Service Justice 
System: 2018 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NLW9-UG6M (information 
available in the Excel spreadsheet at Tables 1 and 6). 
155 Investigations do not include command referrals for prosecution.  





From 2015 to 2018, 53 United Kingdom military personnel were 
prosecuted for rape, and only 8 were convicted of rape, a conviction 
rate of 15% (8/53).156 In 2018, the DAC-IPAD concluded that 431 
personnel were charged with penetrative sexual assaults resulting in 
81 convictions of a penetrative sexual assault offense, and 12 
convictions of a non-penetrative sexual assault offenses for a 
conviction rate of 22% (93/431).157 Thus, the United Kingdom had a 
significantly lower conviction rate for penetrative sexual assault 
offenses than the United States. 
4. General Observations 
In 2019, the active duty military population of Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina was 52,280.158 In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg alone took the 
following actions at general courts-martial for soldiers charged with 
at least one sexual assault charge involving an adult victim: 25 
arraigned; 22 tried to verdict; and 13 convicted of at least one sexual 
assault charge.159 In Fiscal Year 2019, Fort Bragg tried more sexual 
assault cases than the Canadian military in the most recent year (22 
Fort Bragg versus 6 Canada) and obtained 13 convictions whereas 
the Canadian military did not obtain any sexual assault convictions. 
Australia had only two felony-level sexual assault prosecutions (trial 
by general court-martial) in the previous four years, and only one 





156 Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System: 2016, supra note 151 (information 
available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table 6); Sexual Offences in the Service Justice 
System: 2018, supra note 154 (information available in the Excel spreadsheet at Table 
6). 
157 2019 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 123, at A-12. 
158  Fort Bragg In-depth Overview, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, archived at 
https://perma.cc/L9VM-5DKS. 
159 Statistics received on August 14, 2020, from Clerk of Court, U.S. Army Court of 
Criminal Appeals. 
160 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 





United Kingdom personnel convicted of rape or sexual assault is the 
same (13) as the number of Fort Bragg personnel convicted of sexual 
assault in FY 2019 even though the population of the United 
Kingdom military (137,280) is 2.63 times the size of the active duty 
military population of Fort Bragg (52,280). 
Comparisons of the rates of felony-level sexual assault 
prosecutions with Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom do 
not support removing commanders from the process for prosecuting 
military sexual offenses because they do not provide evidence of 
increased convictions for sexual assaults.  
C. THE SAG REPORT ARGUMENTS TO ADOPT FOREIGN 
MODELS. 
As stated previously, the SAG Report suggests that Congress 
emulate the practices used in other countries for determining which 
cases should be referred to trial or alternatively, that a pilot program 
could be used to test the viability of ending the commander’s 
responsibility for ensuring prosecution of serious common law 
offenses.161 As that group notes in its Report to the Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees, several allies of the United States, 
including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have 
transferred responsibility for prosecution of sexual offenses from 
commanders to attorneys.162 The rate of prosecution per thousand of 
active duty personnel in the United Kingdom is about the same as in 
the United States Department of Defense, however, the United 
Kingdom conviction rate for rape is only 15%, while Canada and 
Australia have much lower rates of prosecution of felony-level sexual 
assaults. For example, Canadian military prosecutors did not obtain 





161 See SAG Report, supra note 113, at 12–15. 
162 Id. at App. 16-17. 





assault in the most recent year in which statistics are available.163 In 
2019, Australia did not complete any general courts-martial for any 
offense. 164  In the Australian Armed Forces, all offenses were 
disposed of at military proceedings where the maximum 
confinement was limited to six months, and the military personnel 
who committed serious criminal offenses were tried in civilian 
courts.  
As the Appendix to the SAG Report reflects, the majority of allied 
forces have also transferred responsibility for criminal cases from the 
armed forces to civilian authorities. It is important to note, however, 
that relinquishing jurisdiction to the civilian courts for criminal trials 
of U.S. service members was tried for almost twenty years and failed. 
Specifically, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in O'Callahan v. 
Parker165 in 1969 until 1987, when the Court overturned O’Callahan in 
Solorio v. United States,166 service members could be tried by courts-
martial only for service-related crimes. Thus, the burden fell on the 
civilian prosecutors to decide whether they wanted to try American 
service members for offenses where, for example, the offense was 
committed against civilians or occurred in the civilian community.167 
VIII. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT 
THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE 
There is a danger that in rushing to “fix” what some consider to 
be problems in the military justice system, the delicate balance 
between discipline and justice will be thrown off to the detriment of 
the victims of the alleged offenses, those accused of committing 





163 Canadian 2018-2019 DMP Report, supra note 133, at Annex A.  
164 Australian 2019 DMP Report, supra note 140, at 21-22, Annex A. 
165 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
166 483 U.S. 435 (1987).  
167 See supra note 56. 





The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 as a response to complaints and 
concerns about the operation of the existing Articles of War during 
World War II. In enacting the UCMJ, Congress struggled with the 
issue of balancing the need for command control and discipline 
against the view that the military justice system could be made fairer. 
The final product was considered a compromise. On one hand, there 
was concern about the ability of the commander to maintain 
discipline within the ranks. On the other hand, there was concern 
about protecting the rights of service members against the arbitrary 
actions of commanders. Although the commander remained an 
integral part of the military justice structure, the statute expanded 
due process protections to service members and created a civilian 
court to review courts-martial convictions. Since its enactment, the 
UCMJ has been amended numerous times, sometimes favoring the 
prosecution of offenses and at other times expanding the protections 
of the accused. 
The proposed amendments clearly undermine the commander’s 
authority. Thus, whether intended or not, the change may tip the 
balance in favor of the accused, even though the apparent intent is to 
ensure that more cases go to trial. In so doing, it affects the very core 
of the military justice system—the role of the commander. And it 
adversely affects anyone associated with the alleged offenses in the 
command—witnesses, counsel, and even victims. Currently, the 
commander and his or her legal advisor carefully consider all of 
those interests in deciding whether to prosecute a case or choose 
some other route for dealing with the issue. Placing that decision in 
some distant office creates the possibility that those diverse interests 
are not adequately considered or balanced. 
IX. RECENT STUDIES OF COMMAND DECISIONS TO PROSECUTE 
SEXUAL ASSAULTS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM IS WORKING 
In 2017, the DAC-IPAD formed a Case Review Working Group 
(CRWG) consisting of seven Committee members to review 





individual cases involving sexual offenses.168 The CRWG reviewed 
2,055 investigative case files for probable cause against the subject 
accused of committing the sexual offense, and found the following:  
In about half of the cases reviewed by members that resulted 
in no action against the subject for the penetrative sexual 
offense, the reviewer determined that the victim’s statements 
to law enforcement authorities were insufficient to establish 
probable cause to believe that the subject committed the 
offense.[169] 
*  *  * 
The CRWG found the commander’s initial disposition 
decision to be reasonable in 155 of 164 cases (95%). In 42 of 
the 164 cases (26%), the command preferred charges for a 
penetrative sexual offense; in the remaining 122 cases (74%), 
the command did not prefer charges against the subject for 
the penetrative sexual offense.170  
The committee concluded that the command reasonably decided 
to prefer charges in 40 of 42 cases (95%) and not to prefer charges in 





168 See Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of 
Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD), Fourth Annual Report (Mar. 2020), 
at 19-22 [hereinafter 2020 DAC-IPAD Report], archived at https://perma.cc/W7ZN-
JJDH. 
169 Id. at 22. 
170 Id. at 20. 
171 Id. at 20 n.33. The committee explained their determination not to prefer charges in 
94% of the cases was limited: 
The remaining 6% of decisions not to prefer charges for a penetrative sexual 
assault were found by the majority of reviewers not to be supported by the 
evidence reviewed in the case file. The Committee members note that these 
do not necessarily constitute cases in which charges should have been 
 





cases that cannot be prosecuted for evidentiary reasons—often 
involve[ed] excessive alcohol consumption” by the victim of the 
sexual offense.172 
On November 2019, the DAC-IPAD issued a court-martial 
adjudication data report (Nov. 2019 DAC-IPAD Report) that 
included assessment of courts-martial dispositions of “charge sheets, 
Article 32 reports, and Results of Trial forms for disposition and 
adjudication outcomes,” 173 and on March 30, 2020, the DAC-IPAD 
issued its Fourth Annual Report. 174  The DAC-IPAD database 
includes records of filed sexual offense charges from 4,454 cases from 
FY 2012 to 2018.  
The 2020 DAC-IPAD annual report assessed the disposition of 
cases in which Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officers concluded 
there was not probable cause to believe the accused committed the 
charged offense, and the convening authority nevertheless referred 
the charge to court-martial: 
In FY17, 32 cases were referred to court-martial after an 
Article 32 [P]reliminary [H]earing [O]fficer determined that 
there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sexual 





preferred; rather, the reviewers felt they would need to consider more 
information before they could adequately evaluate whether the disposition 
decision was reasonable. Such additional information could include a 
review of the prosecution merits memorandum and perhaps interviews 
with the judge advocates and commander involved. However, the 
Committee felt that such an endeavor would be unnecessary, since review 
of the 164 cases from the random sample reveals no sign of systemic 
problems with the reasonableness of commanders’ decisions on whether to 
prefer charges in cases involving a penetrative sexual assault. 
2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168, 30. 
172 Id. at 31. 
173 2019 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 123, at 1. 
174 2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168.  





resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In 
17 of the 32 cases (53%), the penetrative sexual offenses were 
tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense 
cases that were tried by court-martial, more than three-
fourths (76%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty. Notably, one 
of the guilty verdicts was overturned on appeal due to lack 
of evidence. 
*  *  * 
In FY18, 18 cases were referred to court-martial after an 
Article 32 [P]reliminary [H]earing [O]fficer determined that 
there was no probable cause to believe a penetrative sex 
offense occurred. Seven of the 18 referred cases (39%) 
resulted in dismissal of the penetrative sexual offense(s). In 
11 of the 18 cases (61%), the penetrative sexual offenses were 
tried by court-martial. Of those penetrative sexual offense 
cases that were tried by court-martial, nearly three-fourths 
(73%) resulted in verdicts of not guilty.175 
The Article 32 Preliminary Hearing Officer is a legal officer, and 
these dispositions show that in at least some cases convening 
authorities are more willing to refer sexual assault cases to trial than 
lawyers. 
The CRWG plans to recommend additional efforts to improve 
the quality and efficiency of criminal investigations, which should 
result in additional prosecutions. 176  In 2020, the Policy Working 
Group plans to analyze Article 32 preliminary hearings, including a 
comparison with federal pretrial processes and a review of the 





175 Id. at 52, 54. 
176 Id. at 22–26. 
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The Policy Working Group will examine disposition guidance for 
judge advocates and convening authorities, and the effectiveness of 
the Staff Judge Advocate’s pretrial advice.178  
X. CONGRESS SHOULD AWAIT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
REFORMS INCLUDED IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 2016, 
WHICH PROVIDES FOR OVERSIGHT AND STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 
The genesis of the proposed change to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice is apparently a concern that commanders abuse their 
authority to decide who is prosecuted. Some observers allege that 
commanders are unwilling to send cases of sexual assault to courts-
martial notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt because of their 
close relationships with members of their command who may be 
accused of crimes or friends of the accused. The Department of 
Defense reduced the risk of this possibility by elevating any decision 
not to prosecute a sexual assault offense to the O-6 special court-
martial convening authority level.  
In the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, 179  Congress 
required an additional review of convening authorities’ decisions not 
to refer charges of certain sex-related offenses for trial by court-
martial. This provision states: 
In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to 
section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges 





178 2020 DAC-IPAD Report, supra note 168, at 56. 
179 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 
Stat. 981 (2013); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-291, 128 Stat. 3372 (2014). 





and the convening authority decides not to refer any charges 
to a court-martial, the convening authority shall forward the 
case file to the Secretary of the military department 
concerned for review as a superior authorized to exercise 
general court-martial convening authority. . . .  
In any case where a convening authority decides not to refer 
a charge of a sex-related offense to trial by court-martial, the 
Secretary of the military department concerned shall review 
the decision as a superior authority authorized to exercise 
general court-martial convening authority if the chief 
prosecutor of the Armed Force concerned, in response to a 
request by the detailed counsel for the Government, requests 
review of the decision by the Secretary. . . . 
In any case where a [S]taff [J]udge [A]dvocate, pursuant to 
section 834 of title 10, United States Code (article 34 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), recommends that charges 
of a sex-related offense should not be referred for trial by 
court-martial and the convening authority decides not to 
refer any charges to a court-martial, the convening authority 
shall forward the case file for review to the next superior 
commander authorized to exercise general court-martial 
convening authority. . . . 
This provision ensures that any decision not to refer a sexual 
assault to trial receives an additional review whenever the original 
convening authority decides not to refer the case to trial by court-
martial. The reviewing convening authority has the authority to refer 
the case to a court-martial. It is implicit that the higher-level 
convening authorities that review a case have authority to hold any 
lower level convening authority accountable for showing poor 
judgment in referral decisions.  





In the Military Justice Act of 2016,180 Congress also amended 
Article 146, UCMJ, and created a “Military Justice Review Panel.” 
That panel will conduct an in-depth review of the military justice 
system every eight years, after its initial review in 2020. This is an 
important step in ensuring that a designated body, apart from 
Congress, will conduct thorough reviews of the system and offer 
proposed changes to the Department of Defense.  
In addition, Congress added provisions to create more 
transparency for assessing the American military justice system. The 
new Article 140a addresses the critical subject of determining trends 
and issues across all of the Services.181 The new article was based on 
an observation by the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault 
Crimes Panel that there is lack of uniform, offense-specific sentencing 
data from military courts which makes meaningful comparison and 
analysis of military and civilian courts “difficult, if not 
impossible.”182 Additionally, Article 140a requires the government to 
facilitate the public’s access to all courts-martial filings and 
records.183 
These additions to the UCMJ can be invaluable tools for 
reviewing and if necessary, reframing military justice procedures. 
Congress should await those reports before making dramatic 
changes to the military justice landscape that will radically change a 





180 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2962. See generally, David 
A. Schlueter, Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49 
St. Mary’s L.J. 1 (2017). 
181 Art. 140a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 940a (2018). 
182 Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel Report, supra note 40, at 
136–37. 
183 That means that courts-martial filings will be available to the public in a manner 
similar to what exists in the PACER system, which is used in the federal civilian court 
system. 





XI. CONCLUSION: REAFFIRMING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF 
COMMANDERS 
On August 17, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a retired 
4-star general, clearly connected military readiness and mission 
success with the commander’s responsibility to enforce discipline. 
He wrote: 
It is incumbent on our leaders to ensure that American 
Forces are always the most disciplined on the battlefield. 
Whatever the domain might be. . . . We must . . . remove the 
cancer of sexual misconduct from our ranks. . . . Enforcing 
standards is a critical component of making our force more 
lethal. Our leaders must uphold proven standards. They 
should know the difference between a mistake and a lack of 
discipline. If a subordinate makes a mistake, leaders should 
learn to coach them better. But we must not tolerate or ignore 
lapses in discipline for our enemies will benefit if we do not 
correct and appropriately punish substandard conduct. . . . 
The military justice system is a powerful tool that preserves 
good order and discipline while protecting the civil rights of 
Service members. It is a commander's duty to use it. Military 
leaders must not interfere with individual cases, but fairness 
to the accused does not prevent military officers from 
appropriately condemning and eradicating malignant 
behavior from our ranks. Leaders must be willing to choose· 
the harder right over the easier wrong. . . Discipline is a 
competitive edge we must seek and maintain each day if we 
are to keep America safe from its enemies. As General 
Washington learned first hand, discipline will make us 
stronger and more lethal. Therefore, let nothing prevent us 





from becoming the most disciplined force this world has 
ever known.184 
The problem of sexual assault allegations over the last decade 
within the Department of Defense is cause for concern and requires 
additional action by the chain of command, including more training 
of personnel and prosecution of all cases whenever warranted. But 
the answer to the problem does not rest in removing or reducing the 
commander’s role. One feature of the military is that it responds and 
adapts, and is capable to issue orders to correct problems. It is very 
clear that the American military justice system has improved since 
its founding and will continue to make adjustments to ensure both 
discipline and justice.  
We recommend that commanders continue to be responsible for 
discipline in their commands and that the proposed amendments to 
the UCMJ be rejected. 
If Congress is to make any changes to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, it should be to first reaffirm the view that the 
primary purpose of the military justice system is to enforce good 
order and discipline, and second, retain the commander’s critical role 
in that system without limitation. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the 
purpose of the military is to fight and win wars.185 To that end, it is 
absolutely essential that commanders—who are ultimately 
responsible for accomplishing that mission—be vested with the 





184 U.S. Marine Corps, Secretary of Defense: Message to the force (Aug. 17, 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/ND3G-5VHF. See also David Vergun, DOD Taking Steps to Prevent 
Sexual Assault and Extremism, DEPT. OF DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2021) (Secretary of 
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated “Sexual assault and extremism will not be tolerated 
in the Defense Department” and he said a commission will assess additional actions 
to curb such conduct), archived at https://perma.cc/PM3G-3BE5. 
185 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 





discipline within their command. Accordingly, we recommend that 
the UCMJ be amended by adding the following section, 10 U.S.C. § 
801a: 
§801a. Art. 1a. Purpose of Military Law: 
The purpose of military law is to assist in maintaining good 
order and discipline in the armed forces, to provide due 
process of law, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the 
military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the 
national security of the United States. 
That proposed language, which is a variation of similar language 
in the preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial,186 reflects the long-
standing and tested view that the military justice system is designed 





186 The Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial lists the due process language first, 
before the language concerning good order and discipline. In our view, the order of 
those purposes is critical. Listing the discipline purpose first more accurately reflects 
the function and purpose of the military justice system. 







FACT SHEETS ON MILITARY JUSTICE IN FOUR ALLIED FORCES 
 
Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Canadian Military Justice (Sept. 18, 
2013) 
 
Michael W. Drapeau, Review of Fact Sheet on Canadian Military 
Justice (Sept. 19, 2013) 
 
Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Australia Military Justice (Sept. 13, 
2013) 
 
Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on United Kingdom Military Justice 
(Corrected Copy) (Sept. 22, 2013) 
 
Lisa M. Schenck, Fact Sheet on Israeli Military Justice (Sept. 9, 
2013) 
